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FEDERAL .ANTITRUST LAW-SHERMAN ACT-RESALE REsTRICTIONS IN
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN MANUFACTURER AND DISTRIBUTORS-Defendant, a manufacturer of heavy trucks, entered into agreements with its wholesale distributors and retail dealers whereby the distributors and dealers agreed to
resell defendant's trucks at prices fixed by defendant. They also agreed to
restrict their sales to customers located within the territories designated by
defendant and to allow defendant to deal directly with all government
accounts. The Justice Department, charging violation of sections I and 3
of the Sherman Act,1 brought a civil suit2 to enjoin defendant from continuing or renewing any of the aforementioned arrangements. On plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment, held, motion granted. Vertical agreements
involving resale price maintenance and the allocation of territories and
customers are unreasonable per se violations of the Sherman Act. United
States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961), jurisdiction
noted, 82 Sup. Ct. 946 (1962).
Since the court had no direct precedents on which to determine the
legality of territorial security agreements,3 it adopted the rationale em-

26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1958).
Under § 4 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
s Territorial security agreements have been under attack by the Justice Department
and the Federal Trade Commission; and a number of consent decrees have prohibited
them. E.g., United States v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 74,006 (W.D.
N.Y. 1958). But the legality of these agreements has not until now been put to a court
test.
1

2
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ployed to prohibit resale price maintenance agreements. In Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. Park & Sons, 4 the Supreme Court recognized that a system
of vertical resale price maintenance agreements between a manufacturer
and each of his distributors eliminated competition among distributors
in much the same way as if the distributors themselves had entered into
a horizontal agreement to charge identical prices. Since any such horizontal
agreement among distributors would be a clear violation of the Sherman
Act,!• the vertical agreements achieving substantially the same results were
held to be illegal per se. In the principal case the system of vertical
territorial security agreements between defendant and his distributors had
the same effect as a horizontal agreement among various distributors to
divide markets and eliminate competition among themselves. Since distributors may not allocate among themselves exclusive territories within
which they would otherwise compete, 6 the court reasoned on the basis of
Dr. Miles that the series of vertical agreements used by defendant to reach
the same result were illegal per se.7
Although this line of analysis may be convenient as an enforcement
tool,8 it is unfortunate that the court felt it necessary to hold territorial
security agreements illegal per se rather than merely illegal under the facts
of the case. By dismissing the subject agreements so summarily, the court
precluded the possibility of finding in any later case that the legitimate
objectives of territorial security agreements may outweigh the concomitant
restrictions on competition. Examples of important lawful purposes of
territorial security agreements might be the orderly nation-wide marketing
of goods and the prevention of transshipments9 which tend to injure the
manufacturer's good will and expose local distributors to destructive price
competition. Admittedly, territorial security agreements restrict inter-terri220 U.S. 373 (19ll).
Addyston Pipe &: Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
The holding is technically limited to situations where the territorial security
agreements are accompanied by resale price maintenance agreements and customer
limitations; but the analysis used by the court would seem to apply to territorial security
agreements even in the absence of these other factors.
8 The Federal Trade Commission has cited the principal case in two recent cases
holding that territorial security agreements and resale price maintenance agreements
create a combination or conspiracy in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958). Snap-On Tools Corp., No.
7116, FTC, Nov. 1, 1961; Sandura Co., No. 7042, FTC, Sept. 15, 1961 (initial decision of
hearing examiner).
o Transshipping (bootlegging) refers to a transaction in which a distributor sells at
a sacrifice price to a dealer in another area. The dealer is thereby able to undercut
all other dealers in his own area. This kind of discount operation can be very detrimental
to the profits of dealers who normally operate at a low margin of profit and therefore
cannot match the discount price. Transshipping also affects the good will and brand name
of the manufacturer because it leads the public to believe that the product is overpriced
at the prevailing retail prices.
4
i.
6
7
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tory competition among distributors of the same manufacturer. But in the
case of small manufacturers attempting to compete with larger, wellestablished manufacturers, these restrictions might enable the small manufacturer to attain the legitimate objectives stated above and to compete
more effectively. If this would be the result, then industry-wide competition
would actually be effectively increased and not diminished. Since restrictions on competition among distributors may strengthen competition among
manufacturers, arguably a court should first ask what kind of competition
the Sherman Act was designed to protect.10 If the court had merely held
White's agreements illegal under the facts rather than illegal per se, it
might have been possible in later cases for defendant to show that under
certain circumstances the net result of territorial security agreements is
entirely consistent with the policies underlying the Sherman Act's provisions.
Had the court wanted to uphold the legality of White's territorial
security agreements, it might have applied the doctrine of ancillary restraint.11 This approach has been used to support the validity of exclusive
dealer agreements in which the manufacturer promises not to appoint any
other dealers within a given area.12 By stressing the main lawful purposes
to be achieved by territorial security agreements, the court could have held
that the agreements were reasonable restraints ancillary to the sale of
White's trucks. But now that the court has refused to apply the doctrine
of ancillary restraint, manufacturers must look to other means by which to
give its dealers some measure of security against problems incident to
transshipments.
A possible solution has been suggested by a number of consent decrees
recognizing the right of an individual manufacturer to choose its own distributors and to designate geographical areas in which its respective distributors shall be primarily responsible for promoting the manufacturer's
product.13 While a distributor is not contractually restricted to this area,
10 Cf. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.),
cert denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). "To penalize the small manufacturer for competing in
this way not only fails to promote the policy of the antitrust laws but defeats it." Id.
at 421.
11 Cf. United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
"Where challenged conduct is subservient or ancillary to a transaction which is itself
legitimate, the decision is not determined by a per se rule. The doctrine of ancillary
restraint is to be applied. It permits, as reasonable, a restraint which (1) is reasonably
necessary to the legitimate primary purpose of the arrangement, and of no broader scope
than reasonably necessary; (2) does not unreasonably affect competition in the market
place; (3) is not imposed by a party or parties with monopoly power." Id. at 178.
12 See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.) cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899
(D. Md.), afj'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
13 E.g., United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 74,203 (D.N.J.
1958); United States v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 74,006 (W.D.N.Y. 1958);
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any concentration on customers outside this area and any transshipments
may justify the manufacturer in finding that the distributor has failed to
devote his best efforts to his own territory, and such a finding might allow
the manufacturer to refuse to deal any further with the particular distributor. As long as there is no conduct on the part of the manufacturer or
distributor implying any agreement14 to restrict the latter's activities to the
area of primary responsibility, the manufacturer's unilateral refusal to deal
should be protected under the Colgate case15 doctrine which recognizes the
right of the private manufacturer to choose the parties with whom he wishes
to deal and to announce in advance the circumstances under which he
will refuse to deal.
Furthermore, the manufacturer may delegate to its distributors the
performance of certain minimum marketing functions, such as the maintenance of a minimum inventory of the manufacturer's product, thorough
promotion of the manufacturer's product within the distributor's area of
primary responsibility, and by the maintenance of a staff and facilities to
perform effectively all marketing functions for which the distributor is
responsible. Once the manufacturer has delegated these minimum marketing functions, he may refuse to deal with any distributor failing to meet
the minimum standards. To the extent that performance of these minimum
functions may tend to combat transshippers, the manufacturer can protect
the legitimate interests of its local dealers along with its own good will.
Whether these arrangements can actually eliminate transshipments remains
to be seen; but in view of the holding in the principal case, they appear to
United States v. J. P. Seeburg Corp., 1957 Trade Cas. 72,476 (N.D. Ill. 1957); United States
v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 71,751 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
14 To reduce the risk that distributor cooperation might evidence an agreement or
conspiracy to allocate territories, the manufacturer should take the following basic precautions: (1) He should omit any reference to territorial restrictions as a condition of
the continuance of the franchise. Any suggestion that distributors restrict their activities
to a designated area should be contained in a clearly unilateral declaration of the
manufacturer's general policy, but the distributor should be free to decide whether or
not to acquiesce therein. In the Matter of Columbus Coated Fabrics Corp., 55 F.T.C.
1500 (1959). (2) He should refrain from soliciting any assurances from nonconforming
distributors that they will adhere to the policy in the future, since such assurances may
imply an agreement between the manufacturer and the distributor. United States v.
Parke, Davis &: Co., 362 U.S. 29, 46 (1960). (3) He should allow only his own employees
and agents to investigate distributor activities, since any assistance by a distributor in
determining whether any distributor is violating the manufacturet's policy is evidence
of an implied agreement. United States v. Bausch &: Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944);
FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441, 455-56 (1922).
15 United States v. Colgate &: Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). "In the absence of any
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long-recognized
right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of
course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to
sell." Id. at 307.
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indicate the boundaries of permissible restrictions on the territorial scope
of distributors' activities.
S. Anthony Benton

